HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF TARGETED SANCTIONS
The
Collective Security order evolved alongside History, towards a system where
threats to the peace can be dealt with thanks to non-military measures, such as
sanctions. These measures can be found
in Article 41 of the UN Charter, their function is to pressure countries that
threaten international peace and security, to correct their policies without
engaging in an armed conflict.
Sanctions
themselves have evolved, from comprehensive sanctions, which target the State
as a whole, to targeted or smart sanctions, which are aimed more specifically
at groups or individuals. The shift to targeted sanctions started with the UDHR
of 1948, which placed emphasis on human rights. Issues were raised about the compatibility of
achieving peace and security, and human rights (Tsagourias, 2013). The importance of human rights in the context
of sanctions became even more striking in the 1990s, especially after the
operations in Iraq, which caused suffering to thousands of innocent civilians
(Daniel, 2011). This led the Security
Council to take targeted sanctions, to minimize the collateral damages caused
to populations.
Since
2011, the Security Council (SC) has taken different Resolutions concerning Libya,
imposing sanctions that are still applied today (arms embargo, assets freeze, and travel ban). This paper will focus
on the Security Council Resolution 2362 (29 June 2017). In light of the particular situation in Libya,
the paper will address the human rights implications of targeted sanctions on
the affected individual’s human rights. To
answer that question, it is useful first of all to explain how the Security
Council is entitled to take these measures. This leads to the assumption that human rights
violations are perpetrated by lawful acts. Secondly, the essay will focus more on the
human rights violations themselves, and on the International Organizations’
point of view.
I.
The
Security Council and targeted sanctions as a matter of concern to international
human rights law
The
legal basis for measures such as sanctions is to be found in the UN Charter,
under Chapter VII. After acting under
Article 39 to determine a threat to international peace and security, Article
41 allows the SC to decide on non-military measures to be used to implement its
decisions, and gives some examples of sanctions. Article 25 of the UN Charter, related to
Article 41, seems to indicate by using the language of sovereignty, that these
measures are binding over the member States.
Another
evidence of the binding character of the sanctions taken by the SC is the
vocabulary used in its resolutions. As
mentioned before, the main Resolution in this paper is the one that the SC took
in June 2017 about Libya: Resolution 2362. In this particular Resolution, the Council
uses a strong vocabulary: it ‘stresses’, ‘condemns’, ‘urges’, and ‘decides’. There is clear evidence that these measures
cause human rights violations (Daniel, 2011). However, there is also proof that the SC recognizes
its human rights obligations. First, it
does not take comprehensive sanctions imposed on States anymore, and moves to
more targeted sanctions, against individuals deemed responsible for threats to
international peace and security (Tsagourias, 2013). Secondly, in light of Resolution 2362, it
seems like the SC is taking precautions. Indeed, it recalls twice that it is ready to
review the measures in its decisions if appropriate (UN Security Council
Resolution, 2017)
There
are other elements to take into account. There exist derogations from certain human
rights obligations. Under International
Treaty Law, States can derogate from some of their obligations, as long as they
do so exceptionally and temporarily.[1] Some argue that the General Assembly should
have applied this logic to the SC when it had the chance.[2] Indeed, even if the SC is not bound by the
ICCPR, it should still follow the principles allowing States to temporarily
derogate from certain human rights obligations in emergency situations, such as
threats to international peace and security.
Another
element is Article 103 of the UN Charter. It is a supremacy clause: the provisions of
the UN Charter shall prevail over other treaty obligations. Some have interpreted that this article can be
used to override other treaties’ obligations, the issue is therefore whether
this article could allow the Security Council to override the human rights
obligations of member States (Tsagaurias, 2013). An illustration of this issue is the General
Comment No.8 about the Iraqi situation. It
was argued that humanitarian law was not applicable, because there was no
intention to violate any human rights.[3]
II.
Interpretations
related to human rights violations and the need for progressive reforms
Comprehensive sanctions were indeed a greater risk to human rights than
targeted sanctions, but it does not mean that these targeted sanctions don’t
violate the human rights of those targeted. Several cases are evidence of this
reality, the reality that Kelsen considers an inherent component part of any
legal order, including one providing collective security (Tsagourias,
2013). In a first case from the ECJ,
‘Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran’ (2006)[4],
the Court held that fundamental rights and safeguards, including the right to a
fair hearing, the obligation to state reasons, and the right to effective
judicial protection, had been violated.[5] The first relevant case was issued by the
Human Rights Committee in 2008: Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium.[6] In this case, it is confirmed that targeted
sanctions are administrative measures and not criminal ones, it was therefore
argued that there were no fair trial requirements issues. However, the Committee found that the right to
privacy and freedom of movement had been violated.[7]
However, in the Kadi cases, the ECJ found that the European Regulation giving force to
the SC Resolutions imposing sanctions infringed the right to fair trial and
property rights of the targeted individuals.[8] With this case arose a conflict between
European Union Treaties and Article 103 of the UN Charter. Indeed, it could be said that the European
Union instances are indirectly bound by Article 103 of the Charter, but it
would mean that the Charter’s obligations prevail over other obligations, such
as human rights obligations for instance. The European Regulation was still annulled,
which seems to suggest that the ECJ does not consider itself bound by Article
103 of the UN Charter. Due to the issues
raised by listing individuals, the Security Council established a non-judicial
mechanism: the ombudsperson.[9] This international mechanism allows listed
individuals to claim a wrongful listing. Some could argue that this ombudsperson does
not meet Kadi’s requirements, some others consider that the slow process of
judicial challenge would undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions regime
(Tsagourias, 2013).
There
exists other evidence of the existence of human rights violations. Studies have underlined that even targeted
sanctions could have side effects on others. In the case of Libya, it has been shown that a trade ban leads to a devaluation of the local currency, but also to
unemployment. Studies show that unemployment leads to human trafficking, and to
prostitution. Furthermore, there is an
obvious tendency to flee to other countries, to find a situation where the
living conditions are not as bad as in Libya or countries of origin (Mariam,
2017). This could pose an issue if
the population blamed the United Nations for imposing sanctions – this is what
happened in 2014 when the Russians supported their Government even more after
the sanctions had fallen (Guy, 2017).
III. Conclusion and general
observations
Today,
human rights are still being violated because of measures like sanctions. However, the improvement is important. Indeed, extensive sanctions are more
detrimental to human rights (economic impact on civilians, public health, living conditions, on education) than targeted or smart sanctions (Dursun,
2017). The Security Council took that
into account and its practice changed: nowadays, most sanctions are targeted
ones. The Resolution which is emphasized
in this paper is also good proof of the fact that the Security Council is now
more concerned about human rights.[10] Indeed, the Preamble insists on the
importance of prosecuting human rights violators, which is the state’s responsibility. These rights are not
absolute, there is a necessity to strike a fair balance between them and
international obligations and the need to tackle threats to international
peace and security (Elizabeth, 2006). This is why there is still this possibility,
for the Security Council, to temporarily override some due process rights when
faced with a threat. However, it is
important to make sure that these temporary and preventive measures do not
become punitive measures, for a long time, or there will be a need to protect
fully the individuals’ due process rights (Tsagourias, 2013).
To
conclude, one could argue that the balance to strike is just like any other
human rights dilemma. Indeed, if the
targeted individuals become targets, it is because they are a risk to society,
therefore the listing procedure protects the rest of the population’s right to
life, meaning a normal and quiet one, for instance, which is to be balanced
with the targets’ rights to a fair trial, to property, and their freedom of
movement.
Bibliography
Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Sanctions
Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice’, (2011),
International Studies Review 13.
Dursun Peksen, ‘Better or Worse?
The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights (2009), Journal of Peace
Research, vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, pp. 59–77, Sage Publications.
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Sanctions, Human Rights, and the Court of First Instance of the European
Community’ (2006), Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 30, Issue 5,
Article 5.
Guy Grossman, Devorah Manekin,
& Yotam Margalit, How Sanctions Affect Public Opinion in Target Countries:
Experimental Evidence from Israel (25 November 2017).
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consequences of multilateral targeted sanctions — Case Study: Libya 2011 until
today’ (CCSI, 31 May 2017) accessed 3 January 2018.
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Tsagourias & Nigel D. White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice
(Cambridge University Press, 2013).
UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 8: The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for
economic, social and cultural rights, 12 December 1997, E/C.12/1997/8, http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079e0.html.
[1] Article 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
[2] GA Res. 64/168 and 65/221
(2010).
[3] UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No.
8: The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social
and cultural rights, 12 December 1997, E/C.12/1997/8, http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079e0.html.
[4]
‘Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council of the European
Union’, Case T-228/02, [2006] E.C.R.
[5]
Elizabeth F. Defeis, ‘Targeted Sanctions, Human Rights, and the Court of First
Instance of the European Community’ (2006), Fordham International Law Journal,
Volume 30, 1457.
[6]
Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, Comm. 1472/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006
(HRC 2008).
[7] Ibid, Individual Opinions Rodley,
Shearer, Motoc, Kalin and Iwasawa.
[8]
Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and
Commission, C-402/05P and C415/05P (ECJ 2008).
[9]
S/RES/1904 (2009).
[10]
S/RES/2362 (2017).
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